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give a set of conditions under which such hybrids facilitate a non-degenerate trade-
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may become degenerate if any of the conditions are dropped. Moreover, we give an
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1. Introduction
When a set of indivisible goods or resources (called objects) has to be assigned to self-
interested agents without the use of monetary transfers, we face an assignment problem.
Examples include the assignment of students to schools, subsidized housing to tenants,
and teachers to training programs (Niederle, Roth and So¨nmez, 2008). Since the seminal
paper of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), this problem has attracted much attention
from mechanism designers (e.g., Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998); Bogomolnaia and
Moulin (2001); Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003); Featherstone (2011)).
It is often desirable or even required that assignment mechanisms perform well on
multiple dimensions, such as efficiency, fairness, and strategyproofness. However, severe
impossibility results prevent the design of mechanisms that excel on all these dimensions
simultaneously (Zhou, 1990). This makes the assignment problem a challenge for
mechanism designs. The Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) mechanism is strategyproof
and anonymous, but only satisfies the baseline requirement of ex-post efficiency. If
strategyproofness is relaxed to weak strategyproofness, the more demanding requirement of
ordinal efficiency can be achieved via the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism. However,
no ordinally efficient, symmetric mechanism can be strategyproof (Bogomolnaia and
Moulin, 2001). The even more demanding requirement of rank efficiency can be achieved
by Rank Value (RV) mechanisms, but at the same time, rank efficiency is in conflict
with even weak strategyproofness. Obviously, trade-offs are necessary and have been
the focus of recent research (e.g., see (Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak and Roth, 2009; Budish,
2012; Aziz, Brandt and Brill, 2013a; Azevedo and Budish, 2015)).
In this paper we investigate a straightforward approach to the problem of trading
off strategyproofness and efficiency of random assignment mechanisms. Specifically,
we use partial strategyproofness (Mennle and Seuken, 2017a) to compare mechanisms
by their incentive properties, and we use ordinal dominance and rank dominance to
compare them by their efficiency properties. We introduce hybrid mechanisms, which
are convex combinations of two component mechanisms, and we show that, subject
to a set of quite intuitive conditions, hybrid mechanisms behave exactly as one would
expect: they facilitate a non-degenerate trade-off between strategyproofness and efficiency.
Instantiating this approach with popular assignment mechanisms, such as RSD, PS, RV,
and variants of the Boston mechanism, we illustrate that the conditions are not trivial;
but when they hold, the efficiency gains (over RSD) can be substantial.
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1.1. Partially Strategyproof Hybrid Mechanisms
Due to restrictive impossibility results pertaining to strategyproofness, we cannot hope
to improve efficiency of mechanisms without relaxing strategyproofness, especially in
the presence of additional fairness criteria, such as anonymity. In (Mennle and Seuken,
2017a) we have introduced a relaxed incentive requirement for assignment mechanisms:
a mechanism is r-partially strategyproof if truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for
agents who have sufficiently different valuations for different objects. The numerical
parameter r controls the extent to which their valuations must vary across objects. r yields
a parametric measure for the strength of the incentive properties of non-strategyproof
mechanisms. Larger values of r P r0, 1s imply stronger incentive guarantees, r “ 1
corresponds to strategyproofness, and r “ 0 does not yield any incentive guarantees. We
use this degree of strategyproofness to quantify the performance of mechanisms on the
strategyproofness-dimensions.
In this paper, we study how hybrid mechanisms trade off strategyproofness and
efficiency. The key idea of hybrid mechanisms is to “mix” a mechanism ϕ that has
good incentive properties and another mechanism ψ that has good efficiency properties.
Concretely, for two component mechanisms ϕ and ψ the β-hybrid is given by hβ “
p1´ βqϕ` βψ. The parameter β P r0, 1s is called the mixing factor. Obviously, h0 “ ϕ
and h1 “ ψ, so that the hybrid mechanisms at the extreme mixing factors β “ 0 and
β “ 1 trivially inherit the desirable property of the respective component mechanism.
For intermediate mixing factors β P p0, 1q hybrids should intuitively inherit a share of
the desirable properties from both component mechanisms.
Regarding the strategyproofness-dimension, we find that this intuition may not always
be justified: as we show in this paper, it can happen that any non-trivial share of ψ (i.e.,
any β ą 0) causes the degree of strategyproofness of the hybrid to drop to 0 immediately.
Our first main result is a set of sufficient conditions that prevent such “degenerate”
behavior: a pair pϕ, ψq is hybrid-admissible if
(1) ϕ is strategyproof,
(2) ψ is upper invariant : a swap of two adjacent objects in an agent’s report does not
change that agent’s probabilities for obtaining an object it prefers to any of the two,
(3) ψ is weakly less varying than ϕ: whenever a swap leads to a change of an agent’s
assignment under ψ, then that agent’s assignment must also change under ϕ.
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For any hybrid-admissible pair, we show that a non-degenerate trade-off is possible in
the sense that for all (even small) relaxations of strategyproofness, the share of ψ that
can be included in the hybrid is non-trivial. Furthermore, we show that it is not possible
to drop any of the the three conditions from hybrid-admissibility and still guarantee that
hybrid mechanisms with intermediate degrees of strategyproofness can be constructed.
1.2. Harnessing Efficiency Improvements
Towards understanding the efficiency improvements that we can obtain through hybrid
mechanisms, we employ the well-known concepts of ordinal and rank dominance. Our
second main result is that if ψ dominates ϕ, then hβ dominates ϕ but is dominated by
ψ. Thus, hybrids have intermediate efficiency in a well-defined sense. One challenge is
that a comparison of ϕ and ψ by dominance may not be possible at every preference
profile. For cases where they are incomparable at some preference profile, we show that
hβ is not dominated by ϕ and hβ does not dominate ψ. In other words, the dominance
comparison of hβ, ϕ, and ψ points in the right direction whenever this comparison is
possible, and it never points in the wrong direction when ϕ and ψ are not comparable.
This shows that if some mechanism ϕ offers good incentives, and another mechanism
ψ has desirable efficiency, then a mechanism designer can trade off strategyproofness
and efficiency systematically by constructing hybrids of ϕ and ψ. Concretely, she can
specify the minimal acceptable degree of strategyproofness ρ and then choose the mixing
factor β as high as possible. The maximal mixing factor βmax is the largest value of
β P r0, 1s for which hβ is ρ-partially strategyproof. The parameter βmax has an appealing
interpretation: it serves as a measure for how far relaxing strategyproofness from “r “ 1”
(i.e., strategyproofness) to “r ě ρ” (i.e., ρ-partial strategyproofness) will take us between
the baseline efficiency of ϕ to the more desirable efficiency of ψ.
This “trade-off” approach to the design of random assignment mechanisms gives rise
to a computational problem: given a setting (i.e., number of agents, number of objects,
and object capacities), as well as a minimal acceptable degree of strategyproofness ρ,
the mechanism designer faces the problem of determining the maximal mixing factor
βmax. In this paper, we show how this problem can be solved algorithmically for any
finite setting.
4
1.3. Hybrids of Popular Mechanisms
Finally, we apply our theory of hybrids to pairs of popular mechanisms. First, we show
that Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) and the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism
form a hybrid-admissible pair. Since PS is ordinally efficient, it ordinally dominates RSD
whenever the two mechanisms are comparable. Therefore, hybrids of RSD and PS can
be used to trade off strategyproofness and efficiency in terms of ordinal dominance.
Second, we show two impossibility result: neither the classic Boston mechanism
(NBM),1 nor Rank Value (RV) mechanisms are weakly less varying than RSD. Further-
more, we demonstrate that hybrids of RSD with NBM or RV indeed have degenerate
incentive properties (i.e., they have a degree of strategyproofness of 0). These findings
illustrate that while hybrid-admissibility is sufficient for non-degenerate trade-offs, it
is also close to being necessary. On a broader scale, these impossibility results serve as
reminders that straightforward approaches, like the construction of hybrid mechanisms,
do not always yield the seemingly obvious outcomes that our intuition may suggest.
Third, we show that the pair of RSD and the adaptive Boston Mechanism (ABM)2 is
also hybrid-admissible. ABM rank dominates RSD whenever the outcomes are compa-
rable, except in a negligibly small number of cases (Mennle and Seuken, 2017c). Thus,
hybrids of RSD and ABM allow non-degenerate trade-offs between strategyproofness and
efficiency in terms of the rank dominance relation (except for the small number of cases).
For both pairs (RSD,PS) and (RSD,ABM), we find numerically that efficiency gains (in
terms of the maximal mixing factor) from relaxing strategyproofness can be substantial.
Organization of this paper: In Sections 2 and 3, we discuss related work and introduce
our formal model. In Section 4, we introduce hybrid-admissibility and show that it
enables the construction of partially strategyproof hybrids.3 In Section 5, we show how
hybrids trade off strategyproofness and efficiency, and we give an algorithm for the
mechanism designer’s problem of determining a maximal mixing factor. In Section 6, we
apply our results to popular assignment mechanisms. Section 7 concludes.
1We call this variant the na¨ıve Boston mechanism because it is “na¨ıve” in the sense that it lets agents
apply to exhausted objects in the application process (Mennle and Seuken, 2017c).
2ABM is a variant of the Boston school choice mechanisms in which students automatically skip
exhausted schools in the application process; see (Mennle and Seuken, 2017c).
3We emphasize that the partial strategyproofness concept imported from (Mennle and Seuken, 2017a)
in Section 4.1 should not be considered a contribution of the present paper.
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2. Related Work
Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) proposed a pseudo-market mechanism for the problem of
assigning students to on-campus housing. However, eliciting agents’ cardinal preferences
is often difficult if not impossible to in settings without money. For this reason, recent
work has focused on ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit rankings over objects.
Carroll (2011), Huesmann and Wambach (2015), and Ehlers et al. (2016) gave systematic
arguments for the focus on ordinal mechanisms.
For the deterministic case, strategyproofness of assignment mechanisms has been
studied extensively, e.g., in (Pa´pai, 2000; Ehlers and Klaus, 2006, 2007; Hatfield, 2009;
Pycia and U¨nver, 2014). For non-deterministic mechanisms, Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez
(1998) showed that RSD is equivalent to the Core from Random Endowments mechanism
for house allocation (if agents’ initial houses are drawn uniformly at random). Erdil (2014)
showed that when capacity exceeds demand, RSD is not the only strategyproof, ex-post
efficient mechanism that satisfies symmetry. On the other hand, Bade (2016) showed
that taking any ex-post efficient, strategyproof, non-bossy, deterministic mechanism and
assigning agents to roles in the mechanism uniformly at random is equivalent to using
RSD. However, when capacity equals demand, it is still an open conjecture whether RSD
is the unique mechanism that is strategyproof, ex-post efficient, and symmetric (Lee
and Sethuraman, 2011). Despite the fact that this conjecture remains to be proven, is
evident that the space of “useful” strategyproof mechanisms is very small.
The research community has also introduced stronger efficiency concepts, such as ordi-
nal efficiency. The Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism, which achieves ordinal efficiency,
was originally introduced by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) for strict preferences and
since then it has been studied extensively: Katta and Sethuraman (2006) introduced an
extension that allows agents to be indifferent between objects. Hashimoto et al. (2014)
showed that PS with equal eating speads is the unique mechanism that is ordinally fair
and non-wasteful. In terms of incentives, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) showed that
PS is not strategyproof but weakly strategyproof in the sense that no agent can obtain a
first order-stochastically dominant assignment by misreporting.
While ex-post efficiency and ordinal efficiency are the two most well-studied efficiency
concepts for assignment mechanisms, some mechanisms used in practice aim at rank
efficiency, which is a further refinement of ordinal efficiency (Featherstone, 2011). How-
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ever, no rank efficient mechanism can even be weakly strategyproof. Other popular
mechanisms, like the Boston mechanism (see (Ergin and So¨nmez, 2006)), are manipulable
but are nevertheless in frequent use. Budish and Cantillon (2012) showed evidence from
course allocation at Harvard Business School, suggesting that using a non-strategyproof
mechanism may lead to higher social welfare than using a strategyproof mechanism such
as RSD. This challenges the view that strategyproofness should be a hard requirement
for mechanism design.
Given that strategyproofness is so restrictive, some researchers have considered relaxed
incentive requirements. For example, Carroll (2013) used approximate strategyproof-
ness for normalized vNM utilities in the voting domain to quantify the incentives to
manipulate under different non-strategyproof voting rules. Budish (2011) proposed
the Competitive Equilibrium from Approximately Equal Incomes mechanism for the
combinatorial assignment problem. For the random social choice domain, Aziz, Brandt
and Brill (2013a) considered first order-stochastic dominance (SD) and sure thing (ST)
dominance. They showed that while RSD is SD-strategyproof, it is merely ST-efficient;
they contrasted this with Strictly Maximal Lotteries, which are SD-efficient but only
ST-strategyproof.
The construction of hybrid mechanisms in the present paper differs from these ap-
proaches: rather than comparing discrete points in the design space, we enable a
continuous trade-off between strategyproofness and efficiency that can be described in
terms of two parameters: the degree of strategyproofness (Mennle and Seuken, 2017a) for
incentive properties and the mixing factor for efficiency. Formally, hybrid mechanisms
are simply probability mixtures of two component mechanisms. Gibbard (1977) used
such mixtures in his seminal characterization of the set of strategyproof random ordinal
mechanisms. In (Mennle and Seuken, 2017b), we have extended Gibbard’s result by
giving a structural characterization of the Pareto frontier of approximately strategyproof
random mechanisms. Hybrid mechanisms play a central role in our characterization.
The present paper differs from (Mennle and Seuken, 2017b) in that we consider the
random assignment domain specifically, and we employ partial strategyproofness, which
is a more appropriate relaxation of strategyproofness in this domain than approximate
strategyproofness.
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3. Formal Model
A setting pN,M, qq consists of a set N of n agents, a set M of m objects, and a vector
q “ pq1, . . . , qmq of capacities (i.e., there are qj units of object j). We assume that
supply satisfies demand (i.e., n ď řjPM qj), since we can always add a dummy object
with capacity n. Each agent i P N has a strict preference order Pi over objects, where
Pi : a ą b means that i strictly prefers object a to object b. We denote the set of all
preference orders by P. A preference profile P “ pP1, . . . , Pnq P PN is a collection of
preference orders of all agents, where P´i P PNztiu are the preference orders of all agents,
except i. Agents’ preferences over objects are extended to preferences over lotteries
via von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utilities ui : M Ñ R`. A utility function ui is
consistent with preference order Pi if Pi : a ą b whenever uipaq ą uipbq. We denote by
UPi the set of all utility functions that are consistent with Pi.
In the random assignment problem, each agent ultimately receives a single object,
but we evaluate random mechanisms based on the resulting interim assignments. Such
assignments are represented by an nˆm-matrix x “ pxi,jqiPN,jPM satisfying the fulfillment
constraint
ř
jPM xi,j “ 1, the capacity constraint
ř
iPN xi,j ď qj, and the probability
constraint xi,j P r0, 1s for all i P N, j PM . The entries of the matrix x are interpreted as
probabilities, where xi,j is the probability that i gets j. An assignment is deterministic
if all agents get exactly one full object, such that xi,j P t0, 1u for all i P N, j P M . For
any agent i, the ith row xi “ pxi,jqjPM of the matrix x is called the assignment vector
of i, or i’s assignment for short. The Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem (Birkhoff, 1946;
von Neumann, 1953) and its extensions (Budish et al., 2013) ensure that, given any
probabilistic assignment, we can always find a lottery over deterministic assignments that
implements its marginal probabilities. Finally, we denote by X and ∆pXq the spaces of
all deterministic and probabilistic assignments, respectively.
A mechanism is a mapping ϕ : PN Ñ ∆pXq that chooses an assignment based
on a profile of reported preference orders. ϕipPi, P´iq is the assignment vector that
agent i receives if it reports Pi and the other agents report P´i. Note that mechanisms
only receive rank ordered lists as input but no additional cardinal information. Thus,
we consider ordinal mechanisms, which determine assignments based on the ordinal
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preference reports alone. The expected utility for i is given by the scalar product
EϕipPi,P´iqruis “ xui, ϕipPi, P´iqy “
ÿ
jPM
uipjq ¨ ϕi,jpPi, P´iq. (1)
Finally, we define hybrid mechanisms, which we study in this paper.
Definition 1 (Hybrid). For mechanisms ϕ, ψ and a mixing factor β P r0, 1s, the β-hybrid
of ϕ and ψ is given by hβ “ p1´ βqϕ` βψ, where for all preference profiles P P PN , the
assignment hβpP q is the β-convex combination of the assignments of ϕpP q and ψpP q.
4. Partially Strategyproof Hybrid Mechanisms
In this section, we first provide a short overview of the partial strategyproofness concept,
which we have introduced in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017a). We then give our first main
result, a set of conditions under which the construction of hybrid mechanisms with
non-degenerate degrees of strategyproofness is possible. Subsequently, we show that
none of the conditions can be dropped without losing this guarantee.
4.1. Full and Partial Strategyproofness
Under a strategyproof mechanism, agents have a dominant strategy to report truthfully.
For random mechanisms, this means that truthful reporting of ordinal preferences
maximizes any agent’s expected utility, independent of the reports of the other agents
and the particular utility function underlying that agent’s preference order.
Definition 2 (Strategyproof). A mechanism ϕ is strategyproof if for any agent i P N ,
any preference profile pPi, P´iq P PN , any misreport P 1i P P, and any utility function
ui P UPi that is consistent with Pi, we have
xui, ϕipPi, P´iq ´ ϕjpP 1i , P´iqy ě 0 (2)
This notion of strategyproofness for random mechanism coincides with the one used by
Gibbard (1977) for random voting mechanisms. For deterministic mechanisms, it reduces
to the requirement that no agent can obtain a strictly preferred object by misreporting.
Furthermore, it is equivalent to strong stochastic dominance-strategyproofness, which
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requires that any agent’s assignment from misreporting is first order-stochastically
dominated by the assignment that the agent can obtain from reporting truthfully.
Partially strategyproof mechanisms (Mennle and Seuken, 2017a) remain strategyproof
on a particular domain restriction. The agents can still have any preference order, but
their underlying utility functions are constrained.
Definition 3 (Uniformly Relatively Bounded Indifference). For r P r0, 1s, a utility
function u P UP satisfies uniformly relatively bounded indifference with respect to
indifference bound r (URBI(r)) if for any objects a, b PM with P : a ą b, we have
r ¨
ˆ
upaq ´min
jPM upjq
˙
ě upbq ´min
jPM upjq. (3)
To obtain some intuition about this domain restriction, observe that a utility function
u : M Ñ R` can be interpreted as a vector in pR`qm. The set UP corresponds to a
convex cone containing all the vectors for which the a-component is strictly larger than
the b-component (provided P : a ą b). Then the set of utility functions that satisfy
URBI(r) and are consistent with P corresponds to a smaller cone inside UP . This smaller
cone is strictly bounded away from the indifference hyperplanes Ha,b “ tupaq “ upbqu
for any two objects a, b PM . Note that the URBI(r) constraint is independent of affine
transformations: if u is translated by adding a constant δ (i.e., u˜pjq “ upjq` δ for all j P
M), then this value will be subtracted again in (3), since minjPM u˜pjq “ minjPM upjq ` δ.
If u is scaled by a factor α ą 0, then this affects both sides of (3) equally, so that the
relative bound r is preserved.
For convenience, we denote by URBI(r) the set of all utility functions that satisfy
uniformly relatively bounded indifference with respect to r. With this domain restriction,
the definition of partial strategyproofness is analogous to the definition of strategyproof-
ness, except that the inequality only needs to hold for agents with utility functions in
URBI(r).
Definition 4 (Partially Strategyproof). For a given setting pN,M, qq and r P r0, 1s we
say that a mechanism ϕ is r-partially strategyproof in pN,M, qq if for any agent i P N ,
any preference profile pPi, P´iq P PN , any misreport P 1i P P, and any utility function
ui P UPi X URBI(r) that is consistent with Pi and satisfies URBI(r), we have
xui, ϕipPi, P´iq ´ ϕjpP 1i , P´iqy ě 0. (4)
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For the remainder of the paper we will fix an arbitrary setting pN,M, qq. Thus, we
will simply say that a mechanism is r-partially strategyproof, omitting the setting but
keeping in mind that the value of r is specific to the respective setting.
One of the main findings in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017a) is that strategyproofness
can be decomposed into three simple axioms, and that the set of partially strategyproof
mechanisms arises by dropping the least important of these axioms. The three axioms
restrict the way in which a mechanism may change an agent’s assignment when this
agent changes its report. For any preference order P P P , its neighborhood NP is the set
of preference orders that can be obtained by swapping two objects that are adjacent in
P . Formally, for P : a1 ą . . . ą am we have
NP “
#
P 1 P P
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ P 1 : a1 ą . . . ą ak´1 ą ak`1 ą ak ą ak`2 ą . . . ą amfor some k P t1, . . . ,m´ 1u
+
. (5)
Definition 5 (Swap Monotonic). A mechanism ϕ is swap monotonic if for any agent
i P N , any preference profile pPi, P´iq P PN , and any misreport P 1i P NPi from the
neighborhood of Pi with Pi : a ą b and P 1i : b ą a, one of the following holds:
• either ϕipPi, P´iq “ ϕipP 1i , P´iq,
• or ϕi,apPi, P´iq ą ϕi,apP 1i , P´iq and ϕi,bpPi, P´iq ă ϕi,bpP 1i , P´iq.
Definition 6 (Upper Invariant). A mechanism ϕ is upper invariant if for any agent
i P N , any preference profile pPi, P´iq P PN , and any misreport P 1i P NPi from the
neighborhood of Pi with Pi : a ą b and P 1i : b ą a, we have that i’s assignment for objects
from the upper contour set of a does not change (i.e., ϕi,jpPi, P´iq “ ϕi,jpP 1i , P´iq for all
j PM with Pi : j ą a).
Definition 7 (Lower Invariant). A mechanism ϕ is lower invariant if for any agent
i P N , any preference profile pPi, P´iq P PN , and any misreport P 1i P NPi from the
neighborhood of Pi with Pi : a ą b and P 1i : b ą a, we have that i’s assignment for
objects from the lower contour set of b does not change (i.e., ϕi,jpPi, P´iq “ ϕi,jpP 1i , P´iq
for all j PM with Pi : b ą j).
Swap monotonicity means that if the mechanism changes an agent’s assignment after
this agent has swapped two adjacent objects in its report, then this change of assignment
must be direct and responsive: if there is any change at all, there must be some change
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for the objects for which differential preferences have been reported, and this change
has to be in the right direction. Upper invariance means that an agent cannot improve
its chances at more preferred objects by changing the order of less preferred objects. In
the presence of an outside option, this is equivalent to robustness to manipulation by
truncation (Hashimoto et al., 2014). Finally, lower invariance is the natural counterpart
for upper invariance. Strategyproofness decomposes into these three axioms, and partial
strategyproofness arises by dropping lower invariance.
Fact 1 (Mennle and Seuken, 2017a). A mechanism is strategyproof if and only if it is
swap monotonic, upper invariant, and lower invariant.
Fact 2 (Mennle and Seuken, 2017a). Given a setting pN,M, qq, a mechanism is r-
partially strategyproof for some r ą 0 if and only if it is swap monotonic and upper
invariant.
Furthermore, the URBI(r) domain restriction is maximal in the sense that for a swap
monotonic, upper invariant mechanism, there is no systematically larger set of utility
functions for which we can also guarantee that truthful reporting is a dominant strategy.
This allows us to define a meaningful, parametric measure for the incentive properties of
non-strategyproof mechanisms.
Definition 8 (Degree of Strategyproofness). Given a setting pN,M, qq and a mechanism
ϕ, the degree of strategyproof of ϕ is the largest indifference bound r P r0, 1s for which ϕ
is r-partially strategyproof. Formally,
ρpN,M,qqpϕq “ maxtr P r0, 1s | ϕ is r-partially strategyproofu. (6)
By virtue of the maximality of the URBI(r) domain restriction, it is meaningful to
compare mechanisms by their degree of strategyproofness. This comparison is consistent
with (but not equivalent to) the comparison of mechanisms by their vulnerability
to manipulation (Pathak and So¨nmez, 2013). In this paper, we use the degree of
strategyproofness to measure and compare the performance of mechanisms on the
strategyproofness-dimension.
12
4.2. Construction of Partially Strategyproof Hybrids
To state our first main result, we define what it means for one mechanism ψ to be
weakly less varying than another mechanism ϕ. This condition is part of our subsequent
definition of hybrid-admissibility.
Definition 9 (Weakly Less Varying). For mechanisms ϕ, ψ, we say that ψ is weakly
less varying than ϕ if for any agent i P N , any preference profile pPi, P´iq P PN , and any
report P 1i P NPi from the neighborhood of Pi we have that
ϕipPi, P´iq “ ϕipP 1i , P´iq ñ ψipPi, P´iq “ ψipP 1i , P´iq. (7)
Loosely speaking, this means that the mechanism ψ (as a function of preference
profiles) must be at least as coarse as ϕ. If ϕ does not change i’s assignment, then a
weakly less varying mechanism ψ must not change it either. This is important for the
incentive properties of hybrids: suppose that some misreport by some agent is beneficial
under ψ. If for the same misreport, ϕ does not change that agent’s assignment, then any
share of ϕ in the hybrid is insufficient to counteract the benefit that the agent obtains
from this manipulation.
We are now ready to formulate hybrid-admissibility.
Definition 10 (Hybrid-Admissible). A pair pϕ, ψq is hybrid-admissible if
(1) ϕ is strategyproof,
(2) ψ is upper invariant,
(3) ψ is weakly less varying than ϕ.
The following Theorem 1 is our first main result. It shows that under hybrid-
admissibility, the degree of strategyproofness ρphβq of hybrid mechanisms varies in
a non-degenerate fashion for varying mixing factors β P r0, 1s.
Theorem 1. Given a setting pN,M, qq, for any hybrid-admissible pair pϕ, ψq we have:
1. for any r ă 1 there exists a non-trivial β ą 0 such that hβ is r-partially strategyproof,
2. the mapping β ÞÑ ρpN,M, qqphβq is monotonic and decreasing.
13
Proof Outline (formal proof in Appendix C.1). Consider agent i with Pi : a1 ą . . . ą am
and a misreport Pi : a1 ą . . . ą aK ą a1K`1 ą . . . ą a1m, where the positions of the
first K objects remain unchanged. The key insight is that we only need to consider
cases where i’s assignment of aK`1 strictly decreases under ϕ. If i receives less of aK`1,
this has a negative effect on i’s expected utility from reporting P 1i . We show that for
utility functions in URBI(r) and sufficiently small β ą 0, this negative effect suffices to
make the misreport P 1i useless. Finally, β ą 0 can be chosen uniformly for all preference
profiles and misreports (while it may depend on the mechanisms and the setting).
Theorem 1 confirms our intuition about the manipulability of hybrids hβ when β
varies between 0 and 1. For mechanism designers, this result is good news: given any
setting, a hybrid-admissible pair of mechanisms and a minimal acceptable degree of
strategyproofness ρ P r0, 1q, we can always find a non-trivial hybrid (i.e., hβ with β ą 0)
that is ρ-partially strategyproof. The fact that a strictly positive β can be chosen implies
that any (even small) relaxation of strategyproofness can enable improvements on the
efficiency-dimension.
If ψ is a more efficient mechanism, then a mechanism designer would intuitively like
to choose a mixing factor as large as possible because more of the more efficient ψ would
be included. In Section 5 we give a precise understanding of the way in which mixing
affects the efficiency of hybrids, and we show that the mechanism designer’s problem of
determining a maximal mixing factor can be solved algorithmically.
4.3. Independence of Hybrid-Admissibility for Theorem 1
We have seen that under hybrid-admissibility, the degree of strategyproofness of hybrid
mechanisms in fact behave as our intuition suggests. Next, we show that dropping either
of the three conditions from hybrid-admissibility will lead to a collapse of this guarantee.
Proposition 1. If ϕ is not strategyproof, there exists a mechanism ψ that is upper
invariant and weakly less varying than ϕ, and a bound r P p0, 1q, such that no non-trivial
hybrid of the pair pϕ, ψq will be r-partially strategyproof.
Proof. Consider a constant mechanism ψ that yields the same assignment, independent
of the agents’ reports. If ϕ is manipulable by some agent i with utility ui, we choose r
such that ui P URBI(r). Then i can manipulate any non-trivial hybrid of ϕ and ψ.
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Proposition 2. For any strategyproof ϕ and any ψ that is weakly less varying than ϕ,
but not upper invariant, no non-trivial hybrid of the pair pϕ, ψq is r-partially strategyproof
for any bound r P p0, 1s.
Proof. Since ϕ is strategyproof, it must be upper invariant by Fact 1. If ψ is not upper
invariant, then neither is any non-trivial hybrid of ϕ and ψ. Consequently, the hybrid is
not r-partially strategyproof for any r ą 0 by Fact 2.
Proposition 3. Let ϕ be a strategyproof mechanism such that for some agent i P N , some
preference profile pPi, P´iq, and some misreport P 1i , we have ϕipPi, P´iq “ ϕipP 1i , P´iq.
Then there exits an upper invariant mechanism ψ such that no non-trivial hybrid of the
pair pϕ, ψq is r-partially strategyproof for any bound r P p0, 1s
Proof. Let j be the best choice object under Pi that changes position between Pi and P
1
i .
Then let ψ be upper invariant with ψi,jpPi, P´iq “ 0 and ψi,jpP 1i , P´iq “ 1. If β ą 0, then
i can manipulate the hybrid hβ in a first order-stochastic dominance sense. Therefore, hβ
cannot be partially strategyproof by Proposition 2 in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017a).
In combination, Propositions 1, 2, and 3 show that none of the three requirements
for hybrid admissibility can be dropped, or else the relaxed incentive properties of the
hybrid mechanisms may be degenerate.
In Section 6 we prove hybrid admissibility for pairs of Random Serial Dictatorship and
Probabilistic Serial, as well as Random Serial Dictatorship with the adaptive Boston
mechanisms. In contrast, for the na¨ıve Boston mechanism and Rank Value mechanisms we
show that neither is weakly less varying than Random Serial Dictatorship. Furthermore,
hybrids of these mechanisms will have a degree of strategyproofness of 0 (unless β “ 0).
This illustrates that while hybrid admissibility is a sufficient condition, it is also close to
being necessary for non-degenerate trade-offs.
5. Parametric Trade-offs Between Strategyproofness
and Efficiency
We have obtained a good understanding of the incentive properties of hybrid mechanisms.
However, ultimately, we are interested in the trade-off between strategyproofness and
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efficiency. To this end, we need to understand the efficiency properties of hybrids. We
first review three notions of dominance, namely ex-post, ordinal, and rank dominance,
and the corresponding efficiency requirements. We then show that, loosely speaking,
hybrid mechanisms inherit a share of the efficiency advantages of the more efficient
component, and this share is proportional to the mixing factor β.
5.1. Dominance and Efficiency Notions
Ex-post efficiency is ubiquitous in assignment problems. Most assignment mechanisms
considered in theory and applications are ex-post efficient, such as Random Serial
Dictatorship, Probabilistic Serial, Rank Value mechanisms, and variants of the Boston
mechanism. Ex-post efficiency requires that ex-post, when every agent finally holds one
object, no Pareto improvements are possible by re-assigning objects.
Definition 11 (Ex-post Efficient). Given a preference profile P P PN , a deterministic
assignment x ex-post dominates another deterministic assignment y at P if all agents
weakly prefer their assigned object under x to their assigned object under y. The
dominance is strict if at least one agent strictly prefers its assigned object under x. A
deterministic assignment x is ex-post efficient at P if it is not strictly ex-post dominated
by any other deterministic assignment at P . Finally, a random assignment is ex-post
efficient at P if it has a lottery decomposition consisting only of deterministic assignments
that are ex-post efficient at P .
To compare random assignments by their efficiency, we draw on notions of dominance
for random assignments.
Definition 12 (Ordinally Efficient). For a preference order P : a1 ą . . . ą am and two
assignment vectors v “ vjPM and w “ wjPM , we say that v first order-stochastically
dominates w at P if for all ranks k P t1, . . . ,mu we haveÿ
jPM :jąak
vj ě
ÿ
jPM :jąak
wj. (8)
For a preference profile P , an assignment x ordinally dominates another assignment y
at P if for all agents i P N , the assignment vector xi first order-stochastically dominates
yi at Pi. x strictly ordinally dominates y at P if in addition inequality (8) is strict for
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some agent i P N and some rank k P t1, . . . ,mu. Finally, x is ordinally efficient at P if
it is not strictly ordinally dominated by any other assignment at P .
If x ordinally dominates y at P and P is the true preference profile of the agents,
then all agents will prefer x to y, independent of their underlying utility functions.
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) showed that the Probabilistic Serial mechanism produces
ordinally efficient assignments (at the reported preference profiles). Moreover, these
assignments may strictly ordinally dominate the assignments obtained from Random
Serial Dictatorship at the same preference profiles.
Featherstone (2011) introduced a strict refinement of ordinal efficiency, called rank
efficiency, and he developed Rank Value mechanisms that produce rank efficient assign-
ments.
Definition 13 (Rank Efficient). For a preference profile P let chPipkq denote the kth
choice object of the agent i with preference order Pi. The rank distribution of an
assignment x at P is a vector dx “ pdx1 , . . . , dxmq with
dxk “
ÿ
iPM
xi,chPi pkq for k P t1, . . . ,mu. (9)
dxk is the expected number of kth choices assigned under x with respect to preference
profile P . An assignment x rank dominates another assignment y at P if dx first
order-stochastically dominates dy (i.e.,
řr
k“1 d
x
k´dyk ě 0 for all r P t1, . . . ,mu). x strictly
rank dominates y at P if this inequality is strict for some rank r P t1, . . . ,mu. x is rank
efficient at P if is not strictly rank dominated by any other assignment at P .
Rank dominance captures the intuition that, for society as a whole, assigning two
first choices and one second choice is preferable to assigning one first and two second
choices. Rank efficient mechanisms in the assignment domain correspond to positional
scoring rules in the social choice domain (Xia and Conitzer, 2008) because they can be
interpreted as maximizing an aggregate score based on ranks (Featherstone, 2011).
5.2. Efficiency of Hybrid Mechanisms
Using the notions of ex-post efficiency, ordinal dominance, and rank dominance, we show
that hybrids inherit a share of the good efficiency properties from the more efficient
component.
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Theorem 2. Given a setting pN,M, qq, for any mechanisms ϕ and ψ, any preference
profile P P PN , and any mixing factor β P r0, 1s the following hold:
1. if ϕpP q and ψpP q are ex-post efficient at P , then hβpP q is ex-post efficient at P ,
2. ψpP q ordinally (or rank) dominates ϕpP q at P if and only if
• hβpP q ordinally (or rank) dominates ϕpP q at P , and
• ψpP q ordinally (or rank) dominates hβpP q at P .
The proof is given in Appendix C.2.
Theorem 2 shows that hybrid mechanisms inherit a part of the desirable efficiency
properties from their more efficient component. Statement 1 is important to ensure that
the baseline requirement of ex-post efficiency is preserved. Statement 2 yields that if
the component ψ is more efficient than the component ϕ in the sense of ordinal or rank
dominance, then all hybrids will have intermediate efficiency (i.e., hβ will dominate ϕ
but be dominated by ψ). Furthermore, it is straightforward to see that under these
conditions, efficiency improves as β increases: consider two different hybrid mechanisms
hβ and hβ
1
with β ă β1. By setting β˚ “ β1´β
1´β , we can write
hβ
1 “ p1´ βq ¨ ϕ` β ¨ ψ “ p1´ β˚q ¨ hβ ` β˚ ¨ ψ (10)
as a β˚-hybrid with components hβ and ψ. Consequently, hybrids with higher mixing
factors dominate hybrids with lower mixing factors.
However, not all mechanisms are comparable everywhere. For example, the Proba-
bilistic Serial mechanism is ordinally efficient, but it does not ordinally dominate the
ordinally inefficient Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism at all preference profiles.
Instead, some assignments resulting under the two mechanisms may not be comparable
by ordinal dominance. In these cases, the second direction of the equivalence in statement
2 becomes useful: when dominance does not permit a clear decision between assignments,
then the hybrid will not have clearly worse efficiency than either component. Thus,
intuitively, efficiency of the hybrid hβ is better than the efficiency of ϕ whenever this
statement is meaningful.
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5.3. A Parametric Measure for Efficiency Gains
Hybrid mechanisms yield a natural measure for efficiency gains, namely the mixing factor
β. First, consider a preference profile P and two mechanisms ϕ, ψ, such that ψpP q
ordinally dominates ϕpP q at P . Independent of the particular vNM utility functions
underlying the agents’ ordinal preferences, we know that every agent has (weakly) higher
expected utility under ψpP q than under ϕpP q. Moreover, the agents’ expected utility
under the hybrid hβ is a linear function of the mixing factor because
Ehβi pP qruis “ p1´ βq ¨ EϕipP qruis ` β ¨ EψipP qruis. (11)
Thus, the gain in any agent’s expected utility from using hβ rather than ϕ is exactly the
β-share of the gain in the agent’s expected utility from using ψ rather than ϕ.
Second, suppose that ψpP q rank dominates ϕpP q at P . A rank valuation v :
t1, . . . ,mu Ñ R with vpkq ě vpk ` 1q is a function that associates a value vpkq with
giving some agent its kth choice object. The v-rank value of an assignment x P ∆pXq is
the aggregate expected value from choosing x and it is given by
vpx,P q “
mÿ
k“1
dxk ¨ vpkq. (12)
Consequently, the v-rank value of the hybrid hβ is a linear function of the mixing factor:
vphβpP q,P q “ p1´ βq ¨ vpϕpP q,P q ` β ¨ vpψpP q,P q. (13)
The fact that ψpP q rank dominates ϕpP q implies that the v-rank value of ψpP q is
(weakly) higher than the v-rank value of ϕpP q for any rank valuation v (Featherstone,
2011). Thus, the gain in v-rank value from using hβ rather than ϕ is exactly the β-share
of the gain in v-rank value from using ψ rather than ϕ.
In combination, Theorems 1 and 2 show that parametric trade-offs between strate-
gyproofness (measured by the degree of strategyproofness ρ) and efficiency (measured by
the mixing factor β) are possible via hybrid mechanisms: when a pair of mechanisms is
hybrid-admissible and the second component dominates the first, a higher mixing factor
will yield hybrids that are more efficient (whenever such a statement is meaningful) but
also have lower degree of strategyproofness.
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5.4. Computability of Maximal Mixing Factor
Given our understanding of hybrids, the question arises how a mechanism designer can
use this construction to perform a trade-off between strategyproofness and efficiency.
Suppose that a minimal acceptable degree of strategyproofness ρ is given. Then the
mechanism designer faces the computational problem of finding the highest mixing factor
β, such that hβ remains ρ-partially strategyproof. Formally, she is interested in
βmaxpN,M, qq,ϕ,ψpρq “ max
 
β P r0, 1s | hβ is ρ-partially strategyproof in pN,M, qq( (14)
In (Mennle and Seuken, 2017a), we have shown that the degree of strategyproofness
ρpN,M, qqpϕq is computable. Thus, we have a solution to the problem of “finding ρphβq,
given β.” However, the mechanism designer’s problem is the inverse of this problem,
namely to “find β, given ρ.” The following algorithm solves this problem.
ALGORITHM 1: BetaMax
Input: setting pN,M, qq, mechanisms ϕ,ψ, bound ρ
Variables: agent i, preference profile pPi, P´iq, misreport P 1i , vectors δϕ, δψ, rank K, choice
function ch, real values βmax, pϕK , p
ψ
K
begin
βmax Ð 1
for i P N, pPi, P´iq P PN , P 1i P P do@j PM : δϕj Ð ϕi,jpPi, P´iq ´ ϕi,jpP 1i , P´iq
@j PM : δψj Ð ψi,jpPi, P´iq ´ ψi,jpP 1i , P´iq
for K P t1, . . . ,mu do
pϕK Ð
řK
k“1 δ
ϕ
chPi pkq ¨ ρ
k
pψK Ð
řK
k“1 δ
ψ
chPi pkq ¨ ρ
k
if pψK ă 0 then
βmax Ð min
!
βmax, pϕK{
´
pϕK ´ pψK
¯)
end
end
end
return βmax
end
Algorithm 1 optimistically sets its guess of βmax to 1. Then it iterates through
all possible preference profiles, all agents, and all misreports that agents may submit.
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For each of these combinations, it uses the partial dominance interpretation of partial
strategyproofness (Theorem 4 in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017a)) to determine whether the
current guess is too high, and the value is adjusted downward if necessary.
Proposition 4. Given a setting pN,M, qq, a hybrid-admissible pair of mechanisms
pϕ, ψq, and a bound ρ P r0, 1s Algorithm 1 (BetaMax) is complete and correct for the
mechanism designer’s problem of finding the maximal mixing factor βmaxpN,M, qq,ϕ,ψpρq.
The proof is given in Appendix C.3.
5.4.1. Computational Cost of BetaMax
Note that our main goal is to show computability, not computational efficiency. Nonethe-
less, we can make a statement about the computational cost of running BetaMax:
computing the random assignments from the mechanisms ϕ and ψ may itself be a
costly operation.4 Thus, if Opϕq and Opψq denote the cost of determining ϕ and ψ
for a single preferences profile, respectively, then the overall cost of Algorithm 1 is
O pn ¨m ¨ pm!qn`1 pOpϕq `Opψqqq.
In the most general case (i.e., without any additional restrictions), a mechanism
is specified in terms of a set of assignment matrices tϕpP q,P P PNu. This set will
contain pm!qn matrices of dimension n ˆm. Consequently, the size of the problem is
S “ pm!qn ¨ n ¨ m. In terms of S, Algorithm 1 has complexity O `S n?S˘. Thus, for
the general case, there is not much room for improvement: since the algorithm must
consider each preference profile at least once, any correct and complete algorithm has
computational cost of at least S.
5.4.2. Reductions of Computational Cost
Reductions of the computational complexity are possible if more information is available
about the mechanisms ϕ and ψ. For anonymous ϕ and ψ, the identities of the agents is
irrelevant. In this case, the computational cost can be reduced to
O
˜
n ¨m!
˜
m!` n´ 1
n
¸
pOpϕq `Opψqq
¸
, (15)
4Determining the probabilistic assignment of a mechanism may be computationally hard, even if
implementing the mechanism is easy (e.g., see (Aziz, Brandt and Brill, 2013b)).
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because only
˜
m!` n´ 1
n
¸
preference profiles must be considered. Moreover, if the
mechanisms are also neutral (i.e., the assignment does not depend on the objects’ names
either), then it suffices to consider only agent 1 with a fixed preference order. With this,
the computational cost can be further reduced to
O
˜
m!
˜
m!` n´ 2
n´ 1
¸
pOpϕq `Opψqq
¸
. (16)
Even with these reductions, running Algorithm 1 is costly for larger settings. However, it
is likely that more efficient algorithms exist for mechanisms with additional restrictions,
and bounds may be derived analytically for certain interesting mechanisms, such as
Probabilistic Serial. Having shown computability, we leave the design of computationally
more efficient algorithms to future research.
6. Application to Pairs of Popular Mechanisms
So far, we have considered abstract hybrid mechanisms and we have derived general
results. In this section, we consider concrete instantiations of our construction. Indeed,
it is applicable to some (but not all) well-known mechanisms. ϕ “ RSD is a canonical
choice because it is the only known mechanism that is strategyproof, ex-post efficient, and
anonymous. In order to apply Theorem 1 (for the construction of partially strategyproof
hybrids), we must establish two requirements for the second component: ψ must be
upper invariant, and ψ must be weakly less varying than RSD. Furthermore, to obtain
efficiency gains, ψ must be more efficient than RSD in some sense. Table 1 provides an
overview of our results. Trade-offs for ordinal dominance can be achieved via hybrids of
RSD and PS, and trade-offs for rank dominance are possible via hybrids of RSD and
ABM. However, NBM and RV both violate hybrid-admissibility (in combination with
RSD), and we find that in fact they do not admit a non-degenerate trade-off.5
6.1. Hybrids of RSD and PS
By Theorem 2 of Hashimoto et al. (2014), PS is upper invariant. Since PS is ordinally
efficient, it is never ordinally dominated by RSD at any preference profile. Furthermore,
5We provide short descriptions of the mechanisms RSD, PS, NBM, ABM, and RV in Appendix A.
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ϕ ψ Dominance UI WLV pϕ,ψq hyb.-adm. hβ PSP
RSD PS Ordinal 3 3 3 3
RSD RV Rank 7 7 7 7
RSD NBM Rank 3 7 7 7
RSD ABM Rank (with exceptions) 3 3 3 3
Table 1: Results overview, UI : ψ upper invariance, WLV : ψ weakly less varying than ϕ,
PSP : r-partially strategyproof for some r ą 0.
PS may (but does not always) ordinally dominate RSD (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001).
Thus, PS ordinally dominates RSD whenever the two mechanisms are comparable. To
obtain hybrid-admissibility of the pair pRSD,PSq, it remains to be shown that PS is
weakly less varying than RSD.
Theorem 3. PS is weakly less varying than RSD.
Proof Outline (formal proof in Appendix C.4). Consider an agent i that swaps two ob-
jects in its report from Pi : a ą b to P 1i : b ą a. First, we show that PS changes the
assignment if and only if neither a nor b are exhausted when i finishes consuming objects
that it strictly prefers to both. Next, we show that RSD changes the assignment if and
only if there exists an ordering of the agents such that all objects that i prefers strictly
to a are assigned before i gets to pick, but neither a nor b are assigned by then. Finally,
we show that the first condition (for PS) implies the second condition (for RSD), using
an inductive argument. The key idea is to show that if no such ordering of the agents
exists for m objects, then we can construct a case with m ´ 1 objects where no such
ordering exists either.
Corollary 1. The pair (RSD,PS) admits the construction of partially strategyproof
hybrids that improve efficiency in terms of ordinal dominance.
6.2. Two Impossibility Results
A mechanism designer may also want to trade off strategyproofness for improvements
of the rank distribution. Mechanisms that aim at achieving a good rank distribution
are Rank Value mechanisms (Featherstone, 2011) and Boston mechanisms (Mennle and
Seuken, 2017c). It turns out, however, that neither RV nor the na¨ıve variant of the
Boston mechanism (NBM) are suitable second components in combination with RSD.
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6.2.1. Impossibility Result for Rank Value Mechanisms
RV rank dominates RSD whenever their outcomes are comparable, since RV is rank effi-
cient, but RSD is not. However, no rank efficient mechanism can be upper invariant, as we
demonstrate in Example 1. Therefore, the pair pRSD,RVq violates hybrid-admissibility.6
Example 1. Consider a setting with agents N “ t1, 2, 3u and objects M “ ta, b, cu,
each available in unit capacity. If the agents have preferences
P1, P2 : a ą b ą c,
P3 : c ą a ą b,
then any rank efficient assignment must assign c to agent 3. Therefore, at least one
of the agents 1 and 2 has a positive probability for b. Without loss of generality, let
RV1,bpP q ą 0. If agent 1 reports
P 11 : a ą c ą b
instead, then the unique rank efficient assignment must assign a to agent 1. Since this
misreport changes agent 1’s assignment of a, RV is not upper invariant.
It follows from Example 1 that any non-trivial hybrid hβ of RSD and RV will violate
upper invariance. This means that hβ will not be r-partially strategyproof for any positive
r ą 0 (by Fact 2), or equivalently, hβ will have a degree of strategyproofness of 0. This
teaches us that RSD and RV indeed do not admit the construction of hybrid mechanisms
that make a non-degenerate trade-off between strategyproofness and efficiency.
6.2.2. Impossibility Result for the Na¨ıve Boston Mechanism
We consider the Boston mechanism with no priorities and single uniform tie-breaking
(Miralles, 2008). The “na¨ıve” variant of the Boston mechanism (NBM ) lets agents
apply to their respective next best choices in consecutive rounds, even if the objects
to which they apply have no more remaining capacity. The assignments from NBM
6In addition to violating upper invariance, RV is not weakly less varying than RSD in general; see
Example 3 in Appendix B.
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rank dominate those from RSD whenever they are comparable, and NBM is also upper
invariant (Mennle and Seuken, 2017c). However, NBM is not weakly less varying than
RSD, as Example 2 shows. Thus, pairs of RSD and NBM violate hybrid-admissibility.
Example 2. Consider a setting with agents N “ t1, . . . , 6u, objects M “ ta, . . . , fu,
each available in unit capacity. Let the agents have preferences
P1, P2 : a ą b ą c ą d ą e ą f
P3, P4, P5, P6 : c ą b ą f ą d ą a ą e.
Under RSD, agent 1’s assignment is
`
1
2
, 1
10
, 0, 7
30
, 1
6
, 0
˘
of objects a through f , respectively.
Swapping c and d in its report will not change its assignment under RSD. Under NBM
and truthful reporting, the assignment is the same as under RSD. But if agent 1 changes
its report by swapping c and d, its assignment under NBM changes to
`
1
2
, 1
10
, 0, 2
5
, 0, 0
˘
.
It strictly prefers this assignment in a first order-stochastic dominance sense.
In fact, Example 2 shows something more, namely that at the particular preference
profile, NBM is manipulable in a first order-stochastic dominance sense, while RSD
does not change the assignment at all. Thus, any hybrid of RSD and NBM will also
be manipulable in a first order-stochastic dominance sense at this preference profile.
Consequently, the hybrid cannot be r-partially strategyproof for any r ą 0 (by Proposition
2 in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017a)). Analogous to the pair pRSD,RVq, we learn that
the pair pRSD,NBMq does not admit the construction of hybrid mechanisms with
non-degenerate degrees of strategyproofness either.
6.3. Hybrids of RSD and ABM
In (Mennle and Seuken, 2017c), we have formalized an adaptive variant of the Boston
mechanism (ABM), which is sensitive to the fact that agents cannot benefit from applying
to objects that were already exhausted in previous rounds. Instead, in each round, agents
who have not been assigned so far, apply to their most preferred available object.
Our analysis of ABM has revealed two further attributes: first, ABM is upper invariant,
one of the conditions we need for hybrid-admissibility (Mennle and Seuken, 2017a).
Second, ABM rank dominates RSD whenever the two mechanisms are comparable,
except in certain special cases (Mennle and Seuken, 2017c). These exceptions occur
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rarely, and the probability of encountering them vanishes as markets get large. Thus,
if we can show that ABM is also weakly less varying than RSD, then we can use this
pair to construct partially strategyproof hybrids that trade off strategyproofness and
efficiency in terms of rank dominance (with the exception of a tiny number of preference
profiles).
Theorem 4. ABM is weakly less varying than RSD.
Proof outline (formal proof in Appendix C.5). Both RSD and ABM are implemented by
randomizing over orderings pi of agents. Suppose i manipulates by swapping a and b. If
ABM changes the assignment, then there exists pi such that all objects that i prefers
strictly to a and b are assigned in previous rounds to other agents. Then i gets to “pick”
between a and b under ABM. Starting with pi, we construct an ordering pi1 such that
if the ordering pi1 is drawn under RSD, i gets to pick between a and b but no object
it strictly prefers to a or b under RSD. This is sufficient for RSD to also change the
assignment.
Corollary 2. The pair (RSD,ABM) admits the construction of partially strategyproof
hybrids that improve efficiency in terms of rank dominate (with few exceptions).
6.4. Numerical Results
We have shown that we can construct interesting hybrids by combining RSD with PS or
ABM. This gives mechanism designers the possibility to trade off strategyproofness for
better efficiency. To illustrate the magnitude of these trade-offs, we have computed βmax
for a variety of settings pN,M, qq and acceptable degrees of strategyproofness ρ P r0, 1s.
Figure 1 shows plots of the maximal mixing factor βmax for settings with unit capacity
and different numbers of objects and agents. Observe that as the acceptable degree of
strategyproofness for the hybrid increases, the allowable share of ψ decreases and becomes
0 if full strategyproofness is required. We also see that the relationship between ρ and
βmax is not linear. In particular, the first efficiency improvements (from βmax “ 0 to
βmax ą 0) are the most “costly” in terms of a reduction of the degree of strategyproofness
ρ. On the other hand, for mild strategyproofness requirements, the share of PS or ABM
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Figure 1: Plots of βmax by acceptable degree of strategyproofness ρ P r0, 1s, for compo-
nents ϕ “ RSD, ψ P tPS,ABMu, and settings with n “ m P t3, 4, 5u.
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Figure 2: Plots of βmax by acceptable degree of strategyproofness ρ P r0, 1s, for compo-
nents ϕ “ RSD, ψ “ PS, and settings with m “ 3, n P t6, 9, 12u.
in the hybrid can be significant, e.g., more than 30% of PS or 17% of ABM for ρ “ 0.75
and n “ m “ 4.
Figure 2 shows plots of βmax for hybrids of RSD and PS, where we hold the number
of objects constant at m “ 3 but vary the capacity of the objects q P t2, 3, 4u (with
n “ q ¨m agents). We observe that for larger capacities, the hybrids can contain a larger
share of PS. This is consistent with findings by Kojima and Manea (2010), who have
shown that for a fixed agent and a fixed number of objects, PS makes truthful reporting
a dominant strategy if the capacities of the objects are sufficiently high. It is conceivable
that the degree of strategyproofness of PS keeps increasing and converges to 1 in the
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limit as capacity increases, an interesting question for future research.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a novel approach to trading off strategyproofness and
efficiency for random assignment mechanisms. We have introduced hybrid mechanisms,
which are convex combinations of two component mechanisms, as a method to facilitate
these trade-offs. Typically, the first component ϕ introduces better incentives while the
second component ψ introduces better efficiency.
For our first result, we have employed partial strategyproofness, a new concept for
relaxing strategyproofness in a parametric way that we have introduced in (Mennle and
Seuken, 2017a). If (1) ϕ is strategyproof and (2) ψ is upper invariant and (3) weakly less
varying than ϕ, we have shown that partially strategyproof hybrids can be constructed
for any desired degree of strategyproofness. At the same time, our hybrid-admissibility
requirement is tight in the sense that none of the three conditions can be dropped without
risking degenerate trade-offs.
For our second result, we have shown that hybrids inherit ex-post efficiency from
their components, and their efficiency (relative to the components) can be understood in
terms of ordinal (or rank) dominance. This means that, in line with intuition, hybrid
mechanisms in fact trade off strategyproofness for efficiency: as the mixing factor β
(i.e., the share of ψ) increases, efficiency of the hybrid increases, but the degree of
strategyproofness decreases. This has important consequences for mechanism designers:
if ϕ is a strategyproof mechanism, ψ is a non-strategyproof alternative that is more
appealing due to its efficiency properties, and a certain degree of strategyproofness ρ ă 1
is acceptable, then a hybrid can be used to improve efficiency, subject to the ρ-partial
strategyproofness constraint. As we have shown in Section 5.4, the mechanism designer’s
problem of determining the maximal mixing factor can be solved algorithmically.
Finally, we have presented instantiations of hybrid mechanisms with ϕ “ RSD as
the strategyproof component. Using ψ “ PS yields better efficiency in an ordinal
dominance sense, and using ψ “ ABM, an adaptive variant of the Boston mechanism,
yields better efficiency in a rank dominance sense (with few exceptions). Numerically,
we have illustrated the connection between the degree of strategyproofness ρ and the
maximal mixing factor βmax, and we have shown that the latter can be significant for
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even mild reductions of the minimal acceptable degree of strategyproofness.
This paper contributes to an important area of research concerned with trade-offs
between strategyproofness and efficiency in the assignment domain. Hybrid mechanisms
break new ground because the method is constructive, it enables a parametric trade-off,
and the mechanism designer’s problem of determining a suitable hybrid is computable.
Our hybrids shed light on the frontiers of such trade-offs and can serve as benchmark
mechanisms for future research.
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APPENDIX
A. Mechanisms
We explain how each mechanism determines the assignment based on a reported profile
P of preferences.
A.1. Random Serial Dictatorship Mechanism
The Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism chooses an agent uniformly at random and
assigns this agent its first choice object. Next, it chooses another agent uniformly at
random from the remaining agent and assigns this agent the object that it prefers most
out of all the objects that have remaining capacity. This continues until all agents have
received an object. The random assignment matrix arises from the fact that agents do
not know when they will be chosen by the mechanism.
A.2. Probabilistic Serial Mechanism
Under the Probabilistic Serial mechanism, the objects are treated as if they were divisible.
All agents start consuming probability shares of their first choice objects at equal speeds.
Once all capacity of an object is completely consumed, all agents who were consuming this
object, move on to their next preferred object. If this next object is already exhausted
as well, they go directly to the next object, and so on. This process continues until all
agents have collected a total of 1 units of some objects. The shares of objects that each
agent has collected are the entries in the assignment matrix of the Probabilistic Serial
mechanism.
A.3. Na¨ıve Boston Mechanism
Under the na¨ıve Boston mechanism, all agents report their preferences and then draw a
random number. The assignment process occurs in rounds. In the first round, each agent
applies to its most preferred object. Applicants are assigned the objects to which they
applied if these have sufficient capacity. If an object has more applicants than remaining
capacity, preference is give to agents with higher random numbers. The agents who did
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not get an object in the first round continue to the second round. In the kth round, each
remaining agent applies to its kth choice. Again, objects are assigned to agents until
their capacity is exhausted, and the unlucky agents with the lowest random numbers
enter the next round. The assignment process ends when all agents have received an
object. The random assignment matrix arises from the fact that agents do not know
their random numbers.
A.4. Adaptive Boston Mechanism
The adaptive Boston mechanism works like the na¨ıve Boston mechanism, except that in
each round, the remaining agents apply to the object that they prefer most out of all
the objects that still have remaining capacity. Again, the random assignment matrix
arises from the fact that agents do not know their random numbers.
A.5. Rank Value Mechanism
Rank Value mechanisms are a class of mechanisms. Given a rank valuation v : t1, . . . ,mu Ñ
R with vpkq ě vpk` 1q, a v-Rank Value mechanism determines an assignment by solving
the following linear program:
maximize
ÿ
iPN
ÿ
jPM
vprankPipjqq ¨ xi,j,
subject to
ÿ
iPN
xi,j “ 1, for all j PM,ÿ
jPM
xi,j ď qj, for all i P N,
xi,j P r0, 1s, for all i P N, j PM,
where rankPipjq is the rank of j under the preference ranking of agent i, i.e., the number
of objects that this agent weakly prefers to j.
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B. Example from Section 6.2
Example 3 (RV not Weakly Less Varying than RSD). Consider a setting N “
t1, . . . , 3u,M “ ta, b, cu, qa “ qb “ qc “ 1. For the preference profile
P1 : a ą b ą c,
P2, P3 : c ą a ą b,
suppose the rank valuation is vp1q “ 10, vp2q “ 6, vp3q “ 0. Then RV will assign b to
agent 1 with certainty. To see this suppose that agent 1 gets a instead. Then some other
agent i received b. If agent 1 and agent i trade, the objective increases by 6´10`6´0 “ 2.
Now suppose that agent 1 gets c. Again some agent i gets object a. If agent 1 and agent
i trade, this improves the objective by 10´ 0` 6´ 10 “ 6. We have argued that agent 1
will get b in any deterministic assignment chosen by RV with rank valuation v. Then by
definition, agent 1 must get b with certainty.
Suppose now that agent 1 reports
P 11 : a ą c ą b
instead, i.e., it swaps objects b and c in its report. Then under any rank efficient
assignment (with respect to pP 11, P´1q), agent 1 will receive object a. This is because
whenever agent 1 gets another object in some deterministic assignment, the objective
improves if agent 1 trades with the agent who received a (independent of v). Since no
rank efficient assignment will give agent 1 any other object than a, swapping b and c
in its report is a beneficial manipulation for agent 1. This is independent of its actual
utility, as long as the utility is consistent with P1.
Now consider the outcome of RSD: it is easy to see that for any ordering of the
agents, if agent 1 does not receive a when it gets to choose, object c will not be available.
Therefore, RSD1pP1, P´1q “ RSD1pP 11, P´1q, i.e., RSD does not change the assignment
of agent 1. This means that RV with the specific choice of rank valuation v is not weakly
less varying than RSD, and agent 1 in the given situation would want to manipulate any
non-trivial hybrid of RSD and RV.
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C. Omitted Proofs
C.1. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. Given a setting pN,M, qq, for any hybrid-admissible pair pϕ, ψq
we have:
1. for any r ă 1 there exists a non-trivial β ą 0 such that hβ is r-partially strategyproof,
2. the mapping β ÞÑ ρpN,M, qqphβq is monotonic and decreasing.
To see statement 2, fix an agent i P N , a preference profile pPi, P´iq P PN , a misreport
P 1i P P , and a utility function ui P UPi . If for any β P r0, 1s, the hybrid hβ is manipulable
for i in this situation, thenA
ui, h
β
i pPi, P´iq ´ hβi pP 1i , P´iq
E
ă 0. (17)
By linearity, we can decompose the left side toA
ui, h
β
i pPi, P´iq ´ hβi pP 1i , P´iq
E
(18)
“ p1´ βq xui, ϕipPi, P´iq ´ ϕipP 1i , P´iqy ` β xui, ψipPi, P´iq ´ ψipP 1i , P´iqy . (19)
The first part (with factor p1´βq must be non-negative by strategyproofness of ϕ. Thus,
xui, ψipPi, P´iq ´ ψipP 1i , P´iqy ă 0. This implies that for any β P r0, Bs, agent i in this
fixed situation will prefer truthful reporting to misreporting P 1i , and for any β P pB, 1s,
it will strictly prefer misreporting P 1i . Consequently, the set of utility functions, for
which the hybrid hβ makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy shrinks as β increases.
Therefore, the maximal bound r for which we can guarantee truthful reporting to be a
dominant strategy for any agent with utility in URBI(r) also shrinks. This implies that
the mapping β ÞÑ ρphβq is monotonic and decreasing.
The proof for statement 1 is more challenging. Consider a strategyproof mechanism ϕ
and a weakly less varying, upper invariant mechanism ψ, a fixed setting pN,M, qq, and
a fixed bound r ă 1. We must find a mixing factor β ą 0 such that no agent with a
utility satisfying URBI(r) will find a beneficial manipulation to the hybrid hβ.
Let P “ pPi, P´iq P PN be a preference profile, ui P UPi a utility function for agent i,
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and let P 1i P P be a potential misreport, where
Pi : a1 ą . . . ą am. (20)
Suppose that ψ changes the assignment for i (otherwise the incentive constraint for
the hybrid mechanism is trivially satisfied for this preference profile and misreport by
strategyproofness of ϕ). By Lemma 1, there exists a rank L P t1, . . . ,m´ 1u such that
the gain in expected utility from reporting P 1i instead of Pi under ψ is upper-bounded by
xui, ψipP 1i , P´iq ´ ψipPi, P´iqy ď uipaLq ´ uipamq, (21)
and the utility gain from reporting Pi truthfully instead of the misreport P
1
i under ϕ is
lower-bounded by
xui, ϕipPi, P´iq ´ ϕipP 1i , P´iqy ě ε ¨ puipaLq ´ uipaL`1qq , (22)
where ε ą 0 depends only on the setting and the mechanism ϕ. Thus, the utility gain
from reporting Pi truthfully instead of the misreport P
1
i under the hybrid h
β is lower
bounded byA
ui, h
β
i pPi, P´iq ´ hβi pP 1i , P´iq
E
(23)
“ p1´ βq xui, ϕipPi, P´iq ´ ϕipP 1i , P´iqy ` β xui, ψipPi, P´iq ´ ψipP 1i , P´iqy (24)
ě p1´ βqε puipaLq ´ uipaL`1qq ´ β puipaLq ´ uipamqq (25)
“ puipaLq ´ uipamqq pεp1´ βq ´ βq ´ puipaL`1q ´ uipamqq pεp1´ βqq . (26)
If ui satisfies URBI(r), we can lower bound the difference uipaLq´uipamq by r puipaL`1q ´ uipamqq
and get A
ui, h
β
i pPi, P´iq ´ hβi pP 1i , P´iq
E
(27)
ě uipaL`1q ´ uipamq
r
pεp1´ βq ´ β ´ rεp1´ βqq . (28)
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Since uipaL`1q´uipamq
r
ě 0, this is positive if and only if
εp1´ βq ´ β ´ rεp1´ βq ě 0 ô β ď εp1´ rq
εp1´ rq ` 1 . (29)
This upper bound for β is strictly positive and independent of the specific utility function
ui, the preference profile pPi, P´iq, and the misreport P 1i . Therefore, hβ is r-partially
strategyproof if β is chosen to satisfy (29).
Lemma 1. Consider a setting pN,M, qq, a strategyproof mechanism ϕ, a weakly less
varying, upper invariant mechanism ψ, an agent i P N , a preference profile P “
pPi, P´iq P PN , a misreport P 1i P P, and a utility function ui P UPi. If ϕipPi, P´iq ‰
ϕipP 1i , P´iq, then there exists L P t1, . . . ,m ´ 1u such that the gain in expected utility
from reporting P 1i instead of Pi under ψ is upper-bounded by
uipaLq ´ uipamq, (30)
and the gain in expected utility from reporting Pi truthfully instead of P
1
i under ϕ is
lower-bounded by
ε puipaLq ´ uipaL`1qq , (31)
where ε ą 0 depends only on the setting and the mechanism ϕ.
Proof. We first introduce the auxiliary concept of the canonical transition. Consider two
preference orders P and P 1. A transition from P to P 1 is a sequence of preference orders
τpP, P 1q “ pP 0, . . . , P Sq such that
• P 0 “ P and P 1 “ P S,
• P k`1 P NPk for all k P t0, . . . , S ´ 1u,
where NP is the neighborhood of preference order P . A transition can be interpreted as
a sequence of swaps of adjacent objects that transform one preference order into another
if applied in order. Suppose,
P 1 : a1 ą a2 ą . . . ą am. (32)
Then the canonical transition is the transition that results from starting at P and
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swapping a1 (which may not be in first position for P ) up until it is in first position.
Then do the same for a2, until it is in second position, and so on, until P
1 is obtained.
Suppose Pi corresponds to the preference ordering
Pi : a1 ą . . . ą aL´1 ą aL ą . . . ą am,
and let aL be the best choice object (under Pi) for which the assignment under ϕ changes,
i.e.,
ϕi,akpPi, P´iq “ ϕi,akpP 1i , P´iq for k ă L, ϕi,aLpPi, P´iq ‰ ϕi,aLpP 1i , P´iq. (33)
Consider the canonical transition from P 1i to Pi. This will bring the objects ak, k ă L
into position (as they are under Pi) first. By Theorem 1 in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017a)
and because ϕ is strategyproof, the assignment for each of these objects can only weakly
increase or weakly decrease. However, by (33) their assignments remain unchanged.
Therefore, the assignment does not change for any of the swaps that bring the objects
ak, k ă L into position. Using that ψ is weakly less varying than ϕ, we can assume that
P 1i : a1 ą . . . ą aL´1 ą a
1
L ą . . . ą a
1
m
without loss of generality.
By upper invariance of ψ, the highest gain the agent could obtain from reporting P 1i
instead of Pi arises if all probability for its last choice is converted to probability for the
best choice for which the assignment can change at all, i.e., aL. Thus, the utility gain is
bounded by
uipaLq ´ uipamq. (34)
Let
ε “ min
#
|ϕi,jpPi, P´iq ´ ϕi,jpP 1i , P´iq|
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ j PM, i P N, pPi, P´iq P PN , P 1i P P :ϕi,jpPi, P´iq ‰ ϕi,jpP 1i , P´iq
+
(35)
be the smallest positive amount by which the assignment of some object to some agent
can change upon a change of report by that agent under ϕ. In the canonical transition
from Pi to P
1
i , the object aL will only be swapped downwards, i.e., its assignment can
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not increase in any step. But since we assumed that it changes, it must strictly decrease.
This decrease has at least magnitude ε by definition. Thus, when misreporting, the
agent looses at least ε probability for aL in some swap. From Theorem 1 in (Mennle and
Seuken, 2017a) we know that the assignment for the other object involved in that swap
must strictly increase by the same amount ε. Since all other swaps reverse the order of
objects from “right” (as under Pi) to “wrong” (as under P
1
i ), the assignment can only
get weakly worse for the agent. Therefore, the gain from reporting Pi truthfully instead
of P 1i under ϕ is at least ε puipaLq ´ uipaL`1qq.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1
C.2. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. Given a setting pN,M, qq, for any mechanisms ϕ and ψ, any
preference profile P P PN , and any mixing factor β P r0, 1s the following hold:
1. if ϕpP q and ψpP q are ex-post efficient at P , then hβpP q is ex-post efficient at P ,
2. ψpP q ordinally (or rank) dominates ϕpP q at P if and only if
• hβpP q ordinally (or rank) dominates ϕpP q at P , and
• ψpP q ordinally (or rank) dominates hβpP q at P .
To see statement 1, note that hβpP q is a convex combination of (and therefore a
lottery over) the assignments ϕpP q and ψpP q. Since both are ex-post efficient, each
has a lottery decomposition into ex-post efficient, deterministic assignments. Therefore,
we can construct a lottery decomposition of hβpP q into ex-post efficient, deterministic
assignments by combining the two lotteries. This shows ex-post efficiency of hβpP q at
P .
Suppose, ψpP q ordinally dominates ϕpP q, i.e., for all i P N and all j PM we haveÿ
j1PM : Pi:j1ľj
ϕi,jpP q ď
ÿ
j1PM : Pi:j1ľj
ψi,jpP q. (36)
With hβpP q “ p1´ βqϕpP q ` βψpP q it follows directly that for any β P r0, 1s,ÿ
j1PM : Pi:j1ľj
ϕi,jpP q ď
ÿ
j1PM : Pi:j1ľj
hβi,jpP q ď
ÿ
j1PM : Pi:j1ľj
ψi,jpP q, (37)
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i.e., ψ ordinally dominates hβ at P , which in turn dominates ϕ. Conversely, if ψpP q
does not ordinally dominate ϕpP q, then there exists some agent i P N and some j PM ,
such that ÿ
j1PM : Pi:j1ľj
ϕi,jpP q ą
ÿ
j1PM : Pi:j1ľj
ψi,jpP q. (38)
Again, by linearity, this impliesÿ
j1PM : Pi:j1ľj
ϕi,jpP q ą
ÿ
j1PM : Pi:j1ľj
hβi,jpP q ą
ÿ
j1PM : Pi:j1ľj
ψi,jpP q, (39)
which means that hβ does not ordinally dominate ϕ and is not ordinally dominated by
ψ. This establishes statement 2 for ordinal dominance. For rank dominance, the result
is analogous, where we exploit the fact that the rank distribution of hβ is the β-convex
combination of the rank distributions of ϕ and ψ.
C.3. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof of Proposition 4. Given a setting pN,M, qq, a hybrid-admissible pair of mecha-
nisms pϕ, ψq, and a bound ρ P r0, 1s Algorithm 1 (BetaMax) is complete and correct for
the mechanism designer’s problem of finding the maximal mixing factor βmaxpN,M, qq,ϕ,ψpρq.
Since there are only finitely many agents, preference profiles, misreports, and ranks,
the loops of the algorithm eventually terminate. Thus, the algorithm terminates on any
admissible input parameters (i.e., completeness).
For correctness, we use the fact that by Theorem 4 in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017a),
r-partial strategyproofness is equivalent to strong r-partial dominance-strategyproofness.
Formally, for any agent i P N , any preference profile pPi, P´iq P PN , any misreport
P 1i P P , and any K P t1, . . . ,mu, we define the following polynomials (in r)
pϕKprq “
ÿ
j: rankPi pjqďK
rrankPi pjq ¨ pϕi,jpPi, P´iq ´ ϕi,jpP 1i , P´iqq , (40)
pψKprq “
ÿ
j: rankPi pjqďK
rrankPi pjq ¨ pψi,jpPi, P´iq ´ ψi,jpP 1i , P´iqq , (41)
where rankPipjq is the rank of j in the preference order of agent i, i.e., the number of
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objects that i weakly prefers to object j. For the hybrid mechanism, the correspoinding
polynomial is
ph
β
K prq “ p1´ βqpϕk prq ` βpψk prq, (42)
and hβ is ρ-partially strategyproof if and only if ph
β
K pρq ě 0 for all combinations
i, pPi, P´iq, P 1i , K. Since ϕ is strategyproof, pϕKpρq ě 0, and therefore, the only way
that ph
β
K pρq can be negative is for pψKpρq to be negative. Conversely, if phβK pρq ě 0 for
some β, then ph
β1
K pρq ě 0 for any β1 ď β as well, i.e., reducing β will not lead to a
violation of any of the positivity constraints. Finally, the only constraints where β is not
arbitrary are those where pψKpρq ă 0 strictly. In this case,
ph
β
K pρq “ p1´ βqpϕKpρq ` βpψKpρq ě 0 (43)
ô β ď p
ϕ
Kpρq
pϕKpρq ´ pψKpρq
(44)
Algorithm BetaMax starts with an optimistic guess of βmax “ 1 and then reduces this
value if this is required to establish a positivity constraint. As we observed, subsequent
further reductions of βmax cannot lead to a renewed violation of a previously checked
constraint. Since the algorithm reduces βmax only when this is strictly required by some
constraint, and this reduction is minimal, the final value of the variable βmax will be
precisely the maximal mixing factor for which hβ is ρ-partially strategyproof.
C.4. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof of Theorem 3. PS is weakly less varying than RSD.
Suppose, n agents compete for m “ ma ` 2`mb objects with capacities given by q,
and let M “ ta1, . . . , ama , x, y, b1, . . . , bmbu. Agent 1 is considering the two preference
reports
P1 : a1 ą . . . ą ama ą x ą y ą b1 ą . . . ą bmb ,
P 11 : a1 ą . . . ą ama ą y ą x ą b1 ą . . . ą bmb ,
where the positions of x and y are reversed in the second report. The reports of the
other agents are fixed and given by P´1.
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Further suppose that with reports pP1, P´1q, the objects where exhausted at times
0 ă τ1 ď τ2 ď . . . ď τm “ 1 under PS. Re-label the objects as j1, . . . , jm in increasing
order of the times at which they were exhausted. If two objects were exhausted at the
same time, re-label them in arbitrary order. Denote by τx and τy the times at which x
and y were exhausted, respectively.
Given these considerations, Claim 1 yields equivalent conditions under which PS
changes the assignment, Claim 2 yields similar conditions under which RSD changes the
assignment, and Claim 3 shows that the former condition implies the latter.
Claim 1. In Theorem 3, PS1pP1, P´1q ‰ PS1pP 11, P´1q if and only if
1. there exists k ě ma such that τ1 ď . . . ď τk ă minpτx, τyq ď 1, and
2. for all l P t1, . . . ,mau there exists l1 P t1, . . . , ku with al “ jl1.
Proof. “ñ” Choose k such that jk is the last of the a1, . . . , ama to run out. Suppose,
τy ď τk. Agent 1 is busy consuming shares of other objects until time τk, regardless
of the reported order of x and y. After τk agent 1 consumes shares of x until it is
exhausted. Because y was already exhausted before τk, agent 1 gets no shares of y.
Under report P 11, it would finish consuming other objects at τk and find objects y
exhausted. Hence, it would begin consuming shares of x immediately, just as it did
under report P1. Thus, the order in which x and y are reported does not matter
for the times at which it consumes objects x and y. Because P1 and P
1
1 only differ
in the order of x and y, the remaining objects are also consumed in the same order
and at the same times. Hence, agent 1’s assignment does not change.
The case for τx ď τk is analogous.
Because PS is non-bossy (Ekici and Kesten, 2012), we know that if the switch
from P1 to P
1
1 did not change the assignment for agent 1, it did not change the
assignment at all.
“ð” Suppose the last of the objects a1, . . . , ama to be exhausted is jk, and τk ă τy ď τx.
Then agent 1 gets no shares of y. If it switches its report to P 11, it will receive a
non-trivial share of y, hence the assignment changes.
Now suppose the opposite, namely τy ą τx. Agent 1 begins consumption of x at
time τk and then turns to y at time τx. Thus, agent 1 receives τx ´ τk shares of x
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and τy ´ τx shares of y. When it switches its report to P 11, it will consume shares
of y between τk and τ
1
y. We need to show that τ
1
y ´ τk ą τy ´ τx. If τ 1y ě τy, this is
clear, because τk ă τx by assumption. In the following we assume τ 1y ă τy.
Let nypτq be the number of agents other than agent 1 consuming shares of y at
time τ . ny is integer-valued and increasing in τ , and there must exist a δ ą 0 such
that nypτy ´ δq ě 1. This means that agent 1 is not the only agent consuming
shares of y before it is exhausted. Otherwise, agent 1 would exhaust y alone, which
implies that agent 1 received no shares of x, a contradiction.
If agent 1 reports P 11 instead, let n1ypτq be the corresponding number of agents
consuming y at times τ . We observe that x will be exhausted later, because agent
1 is no longer consuming shares of it. This means that agents who prefer x over
y will arrive later at y. Agents arriving at y from other objects than x may also
arrive later, because they face less competition from the agents stuck at x, etc.
Therefore n1y ď ny.
Under report P1 from agent 1, y is exhausted by τy, i.e.,
qy “
ż τy
0
nypτq ` 1tτěτxudτ, (45)
and under report P 11, y is exhausted by τ 1y, i.e.,
qy “
ż τ 1y
0
n1ypτq ` 1tτěτkudτ ď
ż τ 1y
0
nypτq ` 1tτěτkudτ. (46)
Equating (45) and (46) givesż τy
0
nypτq ` 1tτěτxudτ ď
ż τ 1y
0
nypτq ` 1tτěτkudτ (47)
ñ
ż τy
τ 1y
nypτq ` 1tτěτkudτ ď
ż τ 1y
0
1tτěτkudτ ´
ż τy
0
1tτěτxudt`
ż τy
τ 1y
1tτěτkudτ(48)
“
ż τy
0
1tτěτku ´ 1tτěτxudτ (49)
“ τx ´ τk. (50)
We know that jk is exhausted before τ
1
y and hence nypτq`1tτěτku ě 1 for τ P rτ 1y, τys,
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and ě 2 for τ P rτy ´ δ, τys. This yields
τy ´ τ 1y ă τx ´ τk, (51)
or equivalently τy ´ τx ă τ 1y ´ τk.
Claim 2. In Theorem 3, RSD1pP 11, P´1q ‰ RSD1pP1, P´1q if and only if there exists a
sequence pc1, . . . , ckcq of kc agents such that if RSD chose these agents first and in this
order, they remove all objects a1, . . . , ama (and possibly more), but neither x, nor y.
Proof. In the RSD mechanism, a permutations of agents is chose amongst all possible
permutations with uniform probability. The probability for agent 1 to get some object j
is
P r1 gets js “ |tpi permutation of N : 1 gets j under piu||tpi permutation of Nu| , (52)
where the denominator is n!, and each permutation under which agent 1 gets j contributes
1
n!
to the total probability.
For some permutation pi consider the turn of agent 1. There are 5 possible cases:
1. Agent 1 faces a choice set including some al’s. This makes no contribution to its
chances of getting x or y.
2. Agent 1 faces a choice set consisting only of bl’s. Again, this makes no contribution
to its chances of getting x or y.
3. Agent 1 faces only bl’s and x, but not y. This case contributes
1
n!
to its chances of
getting x. This contribution is independent of the order in which it ranked x and
y in its report.
4. Agent 1 faces only bl’s and y, but not x. This case contributes
1
n!
to its chances of
getting y and the contribution is again independent of the ranking of x and y.
5. Agent 1 faces x, y and some bl’s, but no al’s. This case contributes
1
n!
to either the
probabilities for x or y, depending on the ranking.
“ñ” If changing from P1 to P 11 influences the assignment, the assignment for agent 1
must have changed. This is because RSD is non-bossy (by Lemma 2). RSD also is
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strategyproof, hence by Theorem 1 in Mennle and Seuken (2017a) the probabilities
for objects x and y must have changed. In all but the last case, the chances do not
depend on the order in which x and y are reported. Thus, at least one permutation
leads to case (5). This means that the sequence of agents chosen prior to agent 1
removes all al’s, but neither x nor y.
“ð” Under report P1, agent 1 will receive x any time case (5) occurs, while under P 11 it
will receive y. If a sequence pc1, . . . , ckcq as defined in Claim 2 exists, it is also the
beginning of at least one permutation. When this permutation is selected, case (5)
occurs. Switching from report P1 to P
1
1 thus strictly increases agent 1’s chances of
getting y.
Claim 3. In Theorem 3, 1. and 2. from Claim 1 imply the existence of a sequence as
described in Claim 2.
Proof. We prove the claim by constructing a sequence of agents
pc1, . . . , ckcq “ pc11, . . . , cq11 , . . . , c1k, . . . , cqkk q (53)
inductively. Under RSD this sequence will remove objects j1, . . . , jk in this order.
Selection of c1k, . . . , c
qk
k By assumption jk was consumed strictly before x, hence τk ă 1.
Then at least qk ` 1 agents receive non-trivial shares of jk. Otherwise, if only qk
agents received shares of jk, they would get the entire capacity and take time 1
to consume it, a contradiction. Select qk of these agents other than agent 1 as
c1k, . . . , c
qk
k .
Because all c1k, . . . , c
qk
k actually received shares of jk under PS, they must all prefer
jk to all other objects except for possibly j1, . . . , jk´1. In other words, suppose that
j1, . . . , jk´1 were removed under RSD in previous turns, the selected agents would
remove jk completely if chosen next (in arbitrary order).
Selection of c1l , . . . , c
ql
l , l ă k Suppose, c1l`1, . . . , cqkk have been selected. Suppose further
that ml agents (plus possibly agent 1) receive non-trivial shares of jl under PS.
There are two cases:
Case 1 At least ql of the ml agents have not been selected as any of the c1l`1, . . . , c
qk
k
so far. Then these agents are chosen as c1l , . . . , c
qk
l .
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Case 2 Only nl ă ql of the ml agents have not been selected so far. The rest of
the ml agents have been selected at k
1 other objects. Let these objects be
jρp1q, . . . , jρpk1q with ρpl1q P tl ` 1, . . . , ku for all l1 P t1, . . . , k1u. At each of the
objects jρpl1q, qρpl1q agents are selected. Now there must be at least ql ´ nl ` 1
additional agents (possibly including agent 1) consuming non-trivial shares
of the objects jρpl1q, otherwise at most nl ` qρp1q ` . . . qρpk1q ` ql ´ nl agents
fully consume objects jl, jρp1q, . . . , jρpk1q. This will take them until time 1, a
contradiction.
There are two possible cases for these additional ql ´ nl agents (excluding
agent 1).
Case 2.1 All of them are available for selection. Then they are selected for
the objects jρpl1q of which they consume non-trivial shares, and the now
free agents can be selected for jl.
Case 2.1 Some of these agents are selected at some other objects jρpk1`1q, . . . , jρpk1`k2q.
Then we use the free agents as in case 2.1, say nl1 . Then we still need
ql´nl´nl1 agents for jl. There must be at least ql` qρp1q` . . .` qρpk2q` 1
agents consuming non-trivial shares of the objects jl, jρp1q, . . . , jρpk2q.
ql ´ nl ´ nl1 are not selected for any of these objects. Again there
are two cases.
We repeat this argument inductively until enough agents are found who are
still available and can replace agents such that the need at object jl can be
satisfied. This must happen, otherwise all agents selected so far as c1l`1, . . . , c
qk
k ,
some n
3
l ă ql agents and possibly agent 1 fully consume objects jl, jl`1, . . . , jk
objects, again a contradiction.
The fact that all selected agents c1l , . . . , c
ql
l , l P t1, . . . , ku receive a non-trivial share in the
objects jl implies that they each prefer jl to all other objects, except possibly j1, . . . , jl´1.
Thus, the sequence pc11, . . . , cqkk q has the properties needed for 2.
Lemma 2. For any distribution over orderings, the respective RSD is non-bossy.
Proof. Fix a distribution over orderings of the agents and let ppi be the probability
that ordering pi is chosen. Suppose that RSD is bossy, then there exists an agents i, i1,
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preference orders Pi, P
1
i , and P´i P PN´i such that RSDipPi, P´iq “ RSDipP 1i , P´iq, but
RSDi1pPi, P´iq ‰ RSDi1pP 1i , P´iq. For the sake of brevity, we write P and P 1 for Pi and
P 1i , respectively.
Let CanpP, P 1q “ pP0 “ P, P1, . . . , Pk´1, Pk “ P 1q be the canonical transition from
P “ Pi to P 1 “ P 1i . As in the proof of Lemma 1, the fact that the assignment is
the same at the start and at the end of the transition implies that the assignment
never changes during the transition, i.e., RSDipPl, P´1q “ RSDipPl`1, P´1q for all l P
t0, . . . , k ´ 1u. Recall that under strategyproof mechanisms, the effect of swaps in the
canonical transition is never undone by subsequent swaps and that swaps only effect the
probabilities for adjacent objects (see Theorem 1 in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017a)). Let
CanpP, P 1q “ pP0 “ P, P1, . . . , Pk´1, Pk “ P 1q be the canonical transition from P “ P0
to P 1 “ Pk. As in the proof of Lemma 1, the fact that the assignment is the same at the
start and at the end of the transition implies that the assignment never changes during
the transition, i.e., RSDipPl, P´1q “ RSDipPl`1, P´1q for all l P t0, . . . , k ´ 1u. Recall
that under strategyproof mechanisms, the effect of swaps in the canonical transition
is never undone by subsequent swaps and that swaps only effect the probabilities for
adjacent objects (see Theorem 1 in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017a)).
But the assignment changed for agent i1, hence it must have changed for agent i1 at
some swap in the transition, say from Pl1 to Pl1`1 P NPl1 . Let j1, j2 be the objects that
were swapped in this transition. Consider an ordering of the agents pi with ppi ą 0. There
are two cases.
• Agent i gets the same object under Pl1 as under Pl1`1. Then the swap had no effect
on the assignment of any other agent, i.e., under pi the swap does not change the
assignment of the other agents.
• Agent i receives j1 under Pl1 , but j2 under Pl1`1. Then the swap changes the
assignment of the agent that received j2 under Pl1 . The magnitude of the change
is ´ppi ă 0. This agent can be i1 by assumption.
However, the latter case is impossible, because this would also strictly increase agent
i’s chances of receiving j2 (by ppi ą 0), implying RSDipPl1 , P´1q ‰ RSDipPl1`1, P´1q, a
contradiction.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3
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C.5. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof of Theorem 4. ABM is weakly less varying than RSD.
Suppose the following manipulation by agent i by a swap:
Pi : a1 ą . . . ą ama ą x ą y ą b1 ą . . . ą bmb
ù P 1i : a1 ą . . . ą ama ą y ą x ą b1 ą . . . ą bmb .
By Lemma 2, RSD changes the assignment (RSDipPi, P´iq ‰ RSDipP 1i , P´iq) if and only
if there exists an ordering of the agents pi such that i gets to pick between x and y in
its turn, but all objects a1, . . . , ama are exhausted by higher-ranking agents. We show
that if ABM changes the assignment, then such an ordering pi exists. Thus, a change of
assignment under ABM implies a change of assignment under RSD.
Suppose, the change of report by agent i from Pi to P
1
i changes the outcome of ABM
for i, i.e., ABMipPi, P´iq ‰ ABMipP 1i , P´iq. Then from the proof of swap monotonicity
(Mennle and Seuken, 2017a) we know that there exists an ordering of the agents pi1
such that in some round (say L), i has not been assigned an object yet, all a1, . . . , ama
are exhausted, but neither x nor y are exhausted. Let rpi1q be the round in which i1 is
assigned its object, and let
Rprq “ ti1 P N | rpi1q “ ru
be the set of agents who receive their assignment in round r (given ordering pi1). If i1
is assigned object j in round r, i1 has applied to j in that round. Thus, out of all the
objects with capacity available at the beginning of round r, i1 must prefer j. Facing the
same set of choices under RSD, i1 would also pick j.
Consider an ordering pi that ranks an agent i1 before another agent i2 if rpi1q ă rpi2q
and ranks them in arbitrary order if rpi1q “ rpi2q. Additionally, let pi rank i after all the
agents in the set Rp1q Y . . .YRpL´ 1q. If RSD chooses pi as the ordering of the agents,
then all agents in Rp1q receive their first choice (as under ABM). Next, all agents in
Rp2q face the choice sets out of which they most prefer the object they were assigned
under ABM. This continues until finally i faces a choice set that includes none of the
a1, . . . , ama , but both x and y. Hence, pi is the ordering we are looking for, and its
existence concludes the proof.
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